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The Good Friday Agreement signed in Belfast in 1998, but still in a process of 
development, is one of a number of peace agreements emerging from apparently 
intractable conflicts, since the end of the cold war.  This article focuses on a relatively 
unexamined aspect of the Agreement - the international relevance of its innovative 
provisions on equality of citizenship and internationalised governance.  The Belfast 
Agreement both implicitly and explicitly deals with the problematic issue of citizenship 
in a state which is highly contested at the constitutional level.  Its development of an 
equality agenda and dynamic cross-border institutions of governance in a situation 
where ultimate sovereignty and allegiance remains contested is a departure from 
current international norms.  The peace process around the Agreement also reflects 
a significantly increased international involvement in the Northern Ireland conflict.  
External support and mediation was essential in brokering an Agreement and will 
inevitably be important in sustaining the new forms of citizenship which are promised 
in its provisions.  Both in its processes and in the framework for citizenship and 
governance suggested by the Agreement, Northern Ireland can provide a useful 
example to the increasing number of nationalist conflicts in the post cold war world.  
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The Northern Ireland peace process and the Good Friday Agreement offer a number 
of challenges to the international literature on citizenship, which has to date not 
engaged with the issues and problems thrown up when the nature and existence of 
the state are contested.  This is reflected in the theoretical assumptions about the 
nature of citizenship that have underpinned political analysis of the Northern Ireland 
conflict and its potential solutions.  The dominant analysis assumes that most 
nationalists would prioritise justice and equality over constitutional issues,1 and 
secondly that unionists prioritise the Union over discriminatory measures and would 
support internal reform if the constitutional threat were removed.2  These 
assumptions are based on the idea that the existing state will gain legitimacy and the 
conflict will end when nationalists are offered and  accept full citizenship of the British 
state.  The conflict resolution strategies resulting from this approach sharply divided 
sovereignty and equality and sought a trade-off between the two.  This strategy failed 
for a number of reasons.  Firstly, it is not clear that nationalists are in fact willing to 
abandon nationalism for justice.  Neither is there any evidence that unionists see 
such a trade off as practicable or in their interests.  Rather, as discussed below, 
Ulster unionists fear that concessions on issues of equality would strengthen Irish 
nationalism and weaken the Union.  Thus exclusion of nationalists from the public 
sphere and full citizenship continues to be an important element of modern Ulster 
unionism. 
 
The Northern Ireland peace process and the Good Friday Agreement have made 
progress because they abandoned previous dogma which saw equality as a 
concession to be granted once the constitutional challenge to the Northern state was 
ended.  The Agreement has sought to fundamentally change the nature of 
citizenship, by dividing issues of citizenship rights, institutions of governance and the 
                                                          
1 e.g. Smith, David and Gerald Chambers, Inequality in Northern Ireland.  Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1991). 
2 e.g. pamphlets by the Cadogan Group, Lost Accord: The 1995 Frameworks and the Search 
for a Settlement in Northern Ireland, 1995 and Square Circles: Round Tables and the Path to 
Peace in Northern Ireland, (Belfast, 1996). 
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ethos of the state from the question of formal sovereignty.  The debate on the 
equality agenda has therefore become part of the definition of citizenship rather than 
a material ‘carrot’ to entice people away from the allegedly symbolic arena of 
nationalism.  If the Good Friday Agreement succeeds it will have done do without 
requiring nationalists or unionists to abandon their political goals or their political and 
ethnic identities.  It will have established power-sharing government, implemented a 
wide-ranging process of internal reform and established significant and dynamic 
supranational institutions of governance.   
 
Within Northern Ireland the major source of opposition to the Agreement has come 
from the unionist population.  Their disagreements with the peace process are not 
confined to the central constitutional issues but also embrace the reform provisions 
around the equality agenda.  This absolute rejection of the extension of citizenship 
rights which would be seen as uncontroversial in most democratic states, to the 
nationalist population, is incomprehensible in the context of the mainstream 
academic literature on citizenship and highlights its inadequacy in contested states.  
The debate on equality in Northern Ireland - reflected in such issues as policing, fair 
employment, cultural rights and Orange marches - has been highly controversial 
because the issues involved clearly reflect the contested nature of the state in 
Northern Ireland. Unionists do not see the demand for ‘parity of esteem’ or ‘equality 
of citizenship’ as an unproblematic demand for the granting of democratic rights.   
Equality issues are seen as inevitably bound up with the nature of the state.  
Unionists feel threatened by the debate on equality of citizenship and ‘parity of 
esteem’ and know that their position is not understood by those outside the unionist 
community.  This is because the debate on equality has been associated with 
nationalist demands for change or even republican attempts to undermine the state.  
Senior Ulster Unionist negotiator Dermot Nesbitt, speaking in the Northern Ireland 
Forum, articulated this clearly saying ‘we have a nationalist position that is portrayed 
as moderate, modern and forward thinking ... on the other hand we are portrayed as 
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hard-line, bigoted, sectarian and narrow-minded’.3  Patricia Campbell (UUP) 
produces  a typical example of an argument that makes little sense outside of 
unionists’ own framework, when she says that ‘the Sinn Féin pursuit of the equality 
agenda stands between us and our goal of a just society.  It is perceived as part of 
their attack on our state and our being, an effort to undermine our society’.4 In a 
similar vein, Jim Rodgers (UUP) in an attack on Sinn Féin councillors says that they 
‘were churning out their hate, as usual, lecturing the council about “parity of esteem”, 
equality, inclusiveness’.5  Unionists themselves are aware that they are often 
speaking in terms which are misunderstood outside Northern Ireland.   Their poor 
external image has been a constant feature in unionist discourse and, at least until 
the late 1980s, and to some extent until today, it resulted in a withdrawal from 
analytical debate.6  The rejection by mainstream unionism of the extension of full and 
equal citizenship to northern nationalists on the grounds that it would weaken the 
Union is at the heart of their opposition to the Good Friday Agreement.  Given the 
weakness of dissident nationalist and republican movements it is the unionist 
opposition which offers the greatest barrier to the successful implementation of the 
Agreement and therefore an understanding of their perspective is essential to 
political progress. 
 
Citizenship in a Contested State 
Unionists’ rejection of the ‘equality agenda’ put forward by nationalists on the 
grounds that it threatens the Union, is not simply paranoia, or a cultural 
predisposition to reduce all matters to history or sovereignty.7  In a sense, unionist 
elites are right.  The Northern Ireland state is contested on all fronts.  The refusal of 
nationalists to support the RUC, their desire to include nationalist symbols in the 
                                                          
3NI Forum, 3 Oct. 1997, vol. 45, p. 52. 
4 Irish News, 19 May 1998. 
5 NI Forum, 20 Feb. 1998, vol. 62, p.38. 
6  Arthur Aughey, Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, (Belfast: 
Blackstaff, 1989), vii. 
7 See Maurna Crozier , Cultural Traditions in Ireland, (Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, 
Queens University Belfast, 1989), 20. 
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public sphere, opposition to Orange marches and the desire for stronger fair 
employment legislation are not just individual stand alone issues of justice.  They are 
for nationalists part of a broader political programme.  Gerry Adams was quite explicit 
in arguing that if unionism rests on power and privilege, as he believed it did, then 
the mobilisation of a nationalist consensus with sufficient international support to 
make progress on an ‘equality agenda’ would weaken unionism.8  Sinn Féin 
recognised that such a consensus could not be mobilised to press for a British 
withdrawal, but that it could be built around ‘equality’ issues and North-South links 
and it would be difficult for the British government to resist the pressure for reform. 
 
Mainstream unionism does not believe that making compromises on equality and 
citizenship will secure the Union or even that it can be done without endangering the 
state.  This is most clearly expressed in the debate around the issue of consent, 
where mainstream unionists have argued that a ‘guarantee’ on the final handover of 
sovereignty is irrelevant if unionists cannot prevent changes in the actual ethos and 
governance of the state.9  Reform measures are opposed not only on their own 
merits but because they represent a shift in the political resources available to each 
community.  They are part of the ‘war of position’ over the future of Northern Ireland, 
part of the hegemonic battle which precedes the struggle for ultimate political 
power.10   Each of the key areas of the equality agenda in Northern Ireland, would be 
described in the international literature as citizen-rights within a state, yet in spite of 
this, reforms in these areas are seen by unionists as having the potential to 
undermine the state.  If the nature of citizenship in Northern Ireland is changed, 
                                                          
8 See Gerry Adams Free Ireland: Towards a Lasting Peace, ( Dingle, Co. Kerry: Brandon, 
1995), 231. 
9 e.g. David Trimble, NI Forum, 12 Sept. 1997, vol. 42, p.3. 
Anthony Alcock, NI Forum, 6 June 1997, vol. 33, p. 38. 
Bob McCartney, NI Forum, 6 June 1997, vol. 33, p.4. 
UUP Response to Frameworks for the Future, 1995 [on www.uup.org, 20 May 1997]. 
10 Phrase ‘war of position’  from Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks.  Q. 
Hoare and G. Nowell Smith eds. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971).  
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mainstream unionists believe that nationalists will use their increased economic, 
political and cultural resources to challenge the constitutional position.11
 
The demands made by nationalists for reform under the banner of equality reflect this 
link between citizen rights and the contested nature of the state in Northern Ireland.  
Mainstream unionists believe that RUC reform will weaken the capacity of the state 
to defend itself, as nationalist recruits, nationalist influenced controlling bodies and a 
force with a non-unionist ethos would not be committed to the defence of the 
Union.12  Even symbolic changes to the RUC's name or use of emblems are 
rejected.13  Ken Maginnis, attacked proposals to replace the symbols and Royal 
prefix of the RUC, claiming that this would produce a ‘neutered RUC, bereft of 
identity and effectiveness from a lack of self confidence’.  Likewise, he rejected the 
need to replace the oath of allegiance to the Queen because taking the oath shows 
‘loyalty to the state, the constitution …  towards those subjects who seek the 
maintenance of their freedom, civil rights and security and protection against crime 
and subversion’.14  Those refusing to swear allegiance to the Queen are, in Maginnis’ 
view, not suitable police officers.   
 
Fair employment legislation is seen by the major unionist parties to weaken the link 
between loyalty and material rewards, reduce nationalist emigration and shift the 
population balance.  It increases the economic resources and ultimately the political 
resources available to nationalism, through its impact in key institutions such as the 
civil service.15  Mainstream unionist parties also reject the need to include nationalist 
                                                          
11 Peter King (UUP), Ulster Review, no. 23, Autumn 1997. 
12 Peter Weir (UUP), NI Forum, 23 Jan. 1998, vol. 58, p.44. 
13 e.g. Ken Maginnis, House of Commons, 15 Dec. 1997, vol. 303, col. 61-9. 
David Trimble in same debate at col. 96. 
Extensive debate in NI Forum 23 Jan. 1998, vol. 58. 
14 Ken Maginnis, House of Commons, 15 Dec. 1997, cols. 63 & 69. 
15 e.g. John Taylor, House of Commons , NI Committee, 16 May 1991, col. 14. 
Orange Standard, July 1993. 
Response by UUP to SACHR Review of fair employment legislation, 4 Jan. 1996 
[www.uup.org, 29 Nov. 1996]. 
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cultural symbols in the public sphere, or reduce the use of exclusively British or 
unionist symbols, because such action reduces the ‘Britishness’ of Northern 
Ireland,16 and the dropping of the British anthem at Queen’s University Belfast, for 
example, was a hugely important issue for unionists.  As Bob McCartney said, it was 
irrelevant that most British universities did not play the anthem at graduations, since 
their Britishness was not in question.17  The increased number of Orange marches 
since the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement is also an expression of this need to 
capture the public space as Orange marches are an effective means of 
demonstrating communal power and solidarity.  The right to march in any part of 
Northern Ireland is important for unionists because they reject the idea that there are 
‘nationalist’ areas.  Ian Paisley jnr., speaking about Drumcree, for example, claimed 
that ‘the media repeatedly and wrongly insisted that this was a march through a 
Catholic area.  The parade at Drumcree was a march past an area where many 
Roman Catholics live … the Queen's highway’.18  Likewise Robert McCartney said 
the Drumcree crisis was ‘effectively about setting up a "defacto" section of the 
Republic of Ireland in Northern Ireland’.19     Unionists make these direct links 
between citizenship rights and state authority because the state is contested and 
unsettled.  Citizenship for mainstream unionists is inevitably an expression of rights 
and duties, which exists to support the state and which can only be expressed in that 
context. 
 
The peace process has also seen unionist politicians publicly express their fears that 
internal reform based on ‘parity of esteem’, allied with North-South links, would 
weaken support for unionism among elements of their own community.20  A very 
simplistic view of European Union functionalism is often utilised to argue that North-
                                                          
16 e.g. Jeffrey Donaldson, NI Forum, 20 June 1997, vol. 35, p.12. 
Ken Maginnis, Irish Independent, 21 Aug. 1986. 
17 Belfast Telegraph, 19 Jan. 1995. 
Similar views from David Trimble, Newsletter,  22 Dec. 1994. 
18 NI Forum, 19 July 1996, vol. 6, p. 41. 
19 Irish Times, 7 July 1997. 
20 e.g.  Cedric Wilson, NI Forum, 13 June 1997, vol. 34, p.41. 
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South bodies would inevitably develop deep and wide roots and that the people 
involved in them would ‘go native’ and lose their allegiance to unionism.21  Unionist 
political elites have been openly critical of leading employers and  business 
organisations from their own community, seeing them as less than wholehearted in 
their support for the positions adopted by mainstream unionism and willing to at least 
partly shift their allegiance or their political practice for the economic benefits of a 
Dublin-Belfast economic corridor, all-Ireland or cross-Border EU funding 
arrangements and the promotion of tourism and investment on an all-Ireland basis.22
 
It is clear that mainstream Ulster Unionism does not make a sharp distinction 
between issues of sovereignty and issues of governance and public policy in 
Northern Ireland.  From fair employment and policing to Orange marches and North-
South bodies Ulster unionism sees concessions on the nature of governance or on 
the equality agenda as weakening their political position and the economic, social 
and cultural  power of their community.  Progress on equal citizenship in Northern 
Ireland is therefore unlikely to be made based on a simple trade-off between equal 
citizenship and formal sovereignty. 
 
Citizenship in an International Context 
The increased focus on citizenship in the international academic literature in recent 
years reflects a global debate on the nature of individuals’ and communities’ 
relationship with the state.  Conflicting pressures in the global political environment - 
many of them related to the ending of the Cold War - have heightened the 
importance of these issues.  The nation-state as a construct is under pressure from 
economic globalisation and regional integration.  Yet the end of the Cold War has 
also unleashed a significant rise in nationalist challenges to existing states, not only 
                                                          
21 e.g. Bob McCartney, NI Forum, 29 Nov. 1996, vol. 20. p.2-5. 
22 e.g. St Clair McAlister (DUP), NI Forum, 20 Feb. 1998, vol. 62, p. 32. 
John Hunter (UUP), NI Forum, 24 Oct. 1997, vol. 48, p. 10, claims that ‘The sort of stooges 
that represent the business community tend to be of the pan-Nationalist front’. 
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in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but in Africa and potentially in 
Western Europe.  The breakdown in the post-war consensus on the welfare state 
during the 1980s has raised important questions about the rights and duties of 
citizens, which have yet to be resolved in either a new consensus or even clear 
alternative paradigms.  The increased focus on individualism in the economic sphere 
has however been challenged by arguments to ‘extend citizenship’ to deal explicitly 
with inequality based on class, gender and race.23  
 
The very limited engagement with the idea of the contested state is, however, a 
crucial weakness in the contemporary literature on citizenship.  When the nature and 
boundaries of the state are contested, debates on the nature of citizenship are 
inevitably framed by that context.  The treatment of Palestinians in Israel or the 
Occupied Territories, of Russians in the Baltic states, or non-Russians in the 
peripheral Russian Republics is not adequately addressed by debates on ethnicity, 
minority rights or even citizen duties.  These issues are given a specific resonance 
when changes in the nature of citizenship are not simply about the distribution of 
rights and resources within the state but are part of a conflict over the existence of 
the state itself.  Citizenship as currently conceptualised in the international academic 
literature does  not therefore provide a framework in which ‘parity of esteem’ can be 
developed in Northern Ireland.  The three dominant models of citizenship in the 
current international literature are so heavily premised on being constituted within an 
uncontested nation-state that they lose their strength in a situation such as Northern 
Ireland and can even reinforce the tendency for exclusion in unionist ideology.   
 
                                                          
23 See for example, Raymond Plant, ‘Citizenship and Rights,’ pp. 1-32 in Raymond Plant and 
Norman Barry Citizenship and Rights in Thatcher’s Britain: Two Views, (London: IEA Health 
and Welfare Unit, 1990). 
Chantal Mouffe, Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, 
(London: Verso, 1992). 
Ruth Lister, Citizenship: feminist perspectives, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997). 
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The Republican or assimilationist model of citizenship is clearly not appropriate in 
analysing current citizen-relations in Northern Ireland.  There is little evidence of 
assimilationist perspectives in mainstream unionists’ view of citizenship, rather 
exclusion has been the dominant response.  Mainstream unionists do not express 
the confidence of traditional French citizenship ideals, which would allow them to 
seek to absorb nationalists into their citizen community.  Such a move would be seen 
as inevitably threatening their own position.  The Republican model also assumes 
that all members of a society want to be citizens in the mould of existing citizens.  
This is clearly not the case in a contested state.  In addition to offering inclusion, this 
approach allows the dominant community to insist on assimilation on their terms.  
Such insistence would deny nationalist identity and not provide the type of equality of 
citizenship which they seek.  Thus Norman Porter in his review of unionist political 
ideas, argues that even though Robert McCartney uses the language of individual 
rights, his vision is as exclusivist as traditional unionism in practice.24  This argument 
has been reinforced by McCartney's alliance with Paisley since the Good Friday 
Agreement.  Indeed McCartney himself was quite explicit that 'parity of esteem' in his 
view could only be offered to Catholics, not nationalists.25  
 
The multi-cultural model, in contrast to assimilationism, does allow for ethnic and 
cultural differences to be given expression in the public sphere.  This could be seen 
as providing a comparative context at least for the moderate unionism of the Alliance 
Party.  The difficulty with multiculturalist views is that they too are premised on an 
acceptance of the nature and boundaries of the state.  Multi-culturalism is seen as an 
expression of citizenship within a clearly defined state.  It has not to date been 
discussed in the context of contested and unsettled states.  Moderate unionists are 
closer to a multi-cultural position, generally arguing that giving nationalists a greater 
sense of ownership would reduce nationalist ‘alienation’ and ultimately stabilise the 
                                                          
24 Norman Porter, Rethinking Unionism: an Alternative Vision for Northern Ireland,  (Belfast: 
Blackstaff Press, 1996), 167-8. 
25 Irish Times, 16 June 1995. 
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state. Even moderate unionists, however, set clear limits to what forms of pluralist 
expression are acceptable - rejecting for example nationalist criticisms of the RUC 
and the official use of overt symbols of Irish nationalism such as the tricolour.26  If 
multiculturalism is used as a comparative model for the position articulated by 
Alliance it is a limited pluralism, premised on the constitutional status quo and 
according allegiance to the British state, thus offering equality as an alternative to 
nationalism rather than in conjunction with it.  It is also, as represented by Alliance’s 
electoral support a minority and diminishing perspective within unionism. 
 
The ethnic model of citizenship, classically represented by the German system of 
citizenship through blood-line rather than residence at birth/naturalisation - has some 
similarities to mainstream unionists’ closed view of citizenship.  Its focus on 
‘belonging’ and its incapacity to fully integrate ‘new’ entrants reflect elements of the 
unionist perspective.  The classic ethnic model of citizenship does not, however, 
capture the totality of unionists’ exclusionary views.  Certainly in broad terms 
nationalists could be said to be excluded as an ethnic group, but fundamentally it is 
their political allegiance rather than their ethnic inheritance which is at issue.  
Theoretically at least, unionists can include the mythical quiet Catholic who is not a 
nationalist.  It is nationalists’ political aspirations which are used to exclude them.  
Catholics who support the union can be allowed within the citizen band even if there 
are few in reality.  Perhaps more significantly, Protestants who ‘go native’ who take 
an anti-unionist political position are excluded despite their ‘ethnic’ inheritance.27  
The nature of exclusion is driven by the political threat to the Union rather than by the 
dangers of cultural mixing highlighted by Barker and McVeigh as characterising ‘new 
                                                          
26 John Alderdice, Irish Times, 10 Jan. 1995. 
Alliance Party submission to the Patten commission on the RUC, 15 Oct. 1998. 
27 See for example unionist reaction to Protestants in the Women's Coalition, in the business 
organisations or in the churches when they challenge mainstream unionist positions.   
e.g.  Jack McKee (DUP), NI Forum, 7 Feb. 1997, vol. 27, p. 46.  
        John Hunter (UUP), NI Forum, 24 Oct. 1997, vol. 48, p.10. 
        David Campbell (UUP), NI Forum, 13 June 1997, vol. 34, pp. 37-8. 
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racism’.28  Ethnic exclusion is traditionally characterised by a fear that allowing 
‘outsiders’ to enter the body politic will change the nature of society, simply because 
they are ‘different’.  In classic ethnic exclusion it is their presence and their difference 
which is highlighted and not their political aspirations.   In Northern Ireland, it is 
nationalists’ political opinions, the perceived threat from the Republic of Ireland, 
unionists’ image of the British government as an unreliable ally, and their siege 
mentality, which drives exclusionary politics within unionism and not a fear of ethnic 
dilution. 
 
There are other problems with trying to conceptualise mainstream unionism’s view of 
citizenship as simply a reflection of ethnic citizenship, primarily related to the nature 
of the Northern Ireland state.  The ethnic model as normally defined reflects the 
exclusion by a dominant community of relatively small minority ethnic communities, 
who are seeking inclusion, within a settled state.  In Germany for example there is no 
political demand for Turkish self-government and no threat to the dominant position 
of ‘ethnic-Germans’, even from a reasonably large Turkish community.  In Northern 
Ireland however it is the unsettled and contested nature of the state which defines 
ethnic communities. The term ‘minority’, even if mathematically accurate, conjures 
images of small communities not a cohesive group making up over 40% of the 
population.  Furthermore there is a real and substantial possibility of change in state 
boundaries.  The ethnic model of citizenship as traditionally defined does not deal 
with these tensions and is therefore not adequate in analysing the politics of 
inequality in Northern Ireland. 
 
Ethnic models of citizenship, despite their common emphasis on exclusion, also have 
a difficulty in dealing with unionists’ relationship, as citizens, to the British state.  
                                                          
28 M. Barker, The New Racism (London: Junction. 1981) and Robbie McVeigh,  ‘Is 
Sectarianism Racism? Theorising the Racism/ Sectarianism Interface’, pp. 179-198 in David 
Miller (ed.) Rethinking Northern Ireland: Culture, Ideology and Colonialism.  (London: 
Longman, 1998). 
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Attitude surveys have shown an increase over the years in the proportion of unionists 
who use the  self-description ‘British’ to define their national or ethnic identity.29  
However it is not an identity that is accorded to them by most of the wider British 
public, who tend to see unionists as being outside of their own ‘imagined 
community’30.    These elements of the unionist position are also not captured in the 
traditional ethnic-citizenship model. 
 
It is the unsettled nature of the state historically and demographically which leads 
unionists to put such weight on the need for dominance and exclusion of nationalists 
and which leads them to see demands for equality of citizenship as a threat.  
Mainstream unionism believed that its strength prior to 1967 was built on hegemonic 
control as much as repressive control.  Opponents of the regime saw little prospect of 
change and so were less likely even to try to demand reform.  It is this hegemonic 
strength, not the precise structures of the pre-1972 Stormont government, which 
unionists wish to re-establish.  There is some division within unionism on the best 
way to achieve this, over devolution versus integration for example.  Mainstream 
unionists seek to defend their position not just against direct assaults on the partition 
settlement but against changes to the nature of citizenship within Northern Ireland.  
The loss of unionist hegemony is not simply a perception by unionists that they have 
lost power resources, it marks an actual shift in both symbolic and material power 
and represents a deepening of the ‘unsettled’ and contested nature of the Northern 
Ireland state.  Mainstream unionist elites do not therefore view their position on 
reform of citizenship as unreasonable.   Compromise on the equality agenda is not 
an issue of ‘low politics’ or of limited importance.  The proposition that if unionists 
gain on the constitution (through the principle of consent) they can give on equal 
                                                          
29 As shown in surveys by Rose, Richard, Governing without Consensus: An Irish 
Perspective.  (London: Faber and Faber, 1971); Edward Moxon-Browne, Nation, Class and 
Creed in Northern Ireland, (Aldershot: Gower, 1983) and David Smith, Equality and Inequality 
in Northern Ireland: Part Three: Perceptions and views.  (London: Policy Studies Institute, 
1987). 
30 Phrase from Benedict Anderson Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and 
spread of nationalism, (London: Verso, 1991). 
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citizenship does not fit within their paradigm.  Rather than trading ‘equality issues’ for 
security, mainstream unionism believes that a model of citizenship as implied in the 
‘equality agenda’ would fatally weaken its own position by strengthening nationalism 
and therefore they are not easily persuaded to follow this approach in negotiations.  
 
The importance of the contested nature of the Northern Ireland state in unionist 
conceptions of citizenship lead to a political strategy based on resistance to reform 
and defence of the status quo.  This heightens unionists’ siege mentality and acts as 
a disincentive to political reform including moves towards equal citizenship.  There 
are also however pressures for change in citizen relations in Northern Ireland.  The 
increasing internationalisation of the Northern Ireland conflict, while adding 
somewhat to unionists’ sense of siege mentality also creates, at times, irresistible 
pressures for change. The split within unionism in response to the peace process 
and the Good Friday Agreement might be seen as evidence of an emerging different 
perspective on citizenship within unionism, or the Agreement itself could be viewed 
as a trade off between inclusiveness and constitutional guarantees for unionists. 
However, such interpretations would be a misreading of unionism’s reaction to the 
peace process.  The split on the Agreement and the decision by pro-agreement 
unionists to support the deal is best understood as a tactical divide in response to the 
changing political environment in which unionism operates.  The different tactical 
responses by unionists have created very sharp and bitter divisions but have not led 
to any ideological realignment.  There is little to suggest that pro-Agreement 
unionists have fundamentally altered their view of citizenship, but they have a 
stronger pragmatic sense of what is possible.  There was also a fear that the British 
and Irish governments might have implemented even more far reaching reforms over 
unionists’ heads if they had withdrawn from talks.31  It is therefore a tactical divide 
                                                          
31 e.g. Anthony Alcock, NI Forum, 3 Oct. 1997, vol. 45, p.10. 
Reinforced even after the agreement during various difficulties in its implementation e.g. 
David Ervine (PUP),  Irish Times, 21 Jan. 1999.   
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which is at the heart of this dispute in unionism, rather than an ideological 
disagreement on the nature of citizenship. 
 
A Changing International Environment 
Until the ending of the Cold War the international pressures for a resolution of the 
Northern Ireland conflict were very minimal.  Neither superpower had any significant 
interest in intervening. The USSR saw little potential beyond raising human rights 
issues as a trade off in forums such as the CSCE.  The USA was unwilling to 
challenge its most important NATO ally.  Despite the occasionally high profile of Irish-
American political activity, US government policy was firmly within the context of the 
‘special relationship’ with Britain.32  Northern Ireland was seen as an internal British 
affair and Irish governments were politely informed that the US administration would 
not intervene.33  Even during crisis situations such as the civil rights period and the 
1981 hunger-strikes this policy held firm.34  Other international interventions were 
equally low key. The UN Security Council was never likely to get involved as Britain 
held a permanent seat and a veto.  The EEC/EC also took a minimalist view.35  No 
other government, apart from the Irish and British had any national interests to 
pursue and so the only other state level intervention came from rogue states such as 
Libya and Iran - with their own separate motives for attacking the British government.  
There were occasional signs of a countervailing view such as US President Jimmy 
Carter’s ban on arms sales to the RUC and Ronald Reagan’s pressure on Margaret  
Thatcher to sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement and there was constant NGO criticism of 
British policy in Northern Ireland but the level of international pressure was never 
enough to have a significant impact. 
                                                          
32 See Joseph O’Grady, ‘An Irish Policy Born in the USA’, Foreign Affairs, 75:2, (1996), 2-7. 
33 See Sean Cronin, Washington’s Irish Policy 1916 - 1986: Independence, Partition, 
Neutrality, (Dublin: Anvil Books, 1987), 192 and Dermot Keogh, Twentieth Century Ireland, 
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1994), 194. 
34 See Cronin, (1987),320 and Andrew J. Wilson, Irish America and the Ulster Conflict, 1968-
1995, (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1995), 64. 
35 See Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, The dynamics of conflict in Northern Ireland, power, 
conflict and emancipation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 280. Also 
statement by Jacques Delors, Irish Times, 4 Nov. 1992, cited in Ruane and Todd (1996), 280. 
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The ending of the Cold War however opened up much greater possibilities.  It 
weakened or at least lessened the absolute priority accorded to strategic security 
and military alliances in US (and indeed British) foreign policy.  This gave Bill Clinton, 
the first US President elected  after the Cold War, the flexibility to pursue foreign 
policy goals which might strain relations with Britain.  Relieved of the overwhelming 
weight of Cold War concerns, Clinton could ignore the advice of the US State 
Department, the FBI and the CIA in granting Gerry Adams a visa to enter the USA36  
and in intervening more forcefully in the developing Irish peace process.  It is difficult 
to conceive a US President making those decisions during the Cold War.  This is not 
to ignore the domestic pressure on Clinton, a product of his party’s need to win back 
Irish Americans who were part of the Reagan-Democrat bloc and also under 
pressure from a much more professional and influential Irish American lobby - itself 
partly a response to the changing strategy of Sinn Féin in Ireland.37  Both the 
domestic pressures and the urgings of Irish governments could have been ignored if 
global strategic interests were at stake.  The fact that the US administration and 
President Clinton personally have been so heavily involved in the negotiation process 
undeniably increased the pressure on political actors, including unionists, to reach 
agreement. 
 
Other international factors were also significant at this time.  Political conflicts and 
‘struggles’ which the Sinn Féin leadership had drawn inspiration from or sought to 
compare themselves with, in South Africa, Palestine and Central America were 
moving towards peace negotiations and settlements.38  The post-Cold War world 
                                                          
36 Niall O’Dowd, cited in Tim Pat Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal 1966-1995 and the 
Search for Peace, (London: Hutchinson.1995), 373. 
37  Niall O’Dowd, 'The Greening of the White House: Clinton's Irish Agenda, Irish America 
Magazine, (Jan./Feb. 1993), 20. 
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‘Irish Republicanism: A New Beginning?’, pp. 176-92 in James Anderson and James 
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would leave limited room for ‘national liberation movements’ which had drawn heavily 
on socialist ideology or Soviet support.  Though the Republican Movement did not 
face significant financial or military material losses they were affected by the political 
climate which these developments created and were part of.  At an ideological level, 
and in the case of South Africa at the level of extensive personal contacts,39 the 
emergence of international peace processes had a significant impact on republican 
thinking.  Finally, in a post-Cold War world there was always the possibility that a 
British establishment, relieved of its Cold War fears, would be less antagonistic to 
new political arrangements for the island of Ireland, if a new dynamic could be 
created to put Northern Ireland on the international agenda.  A new military dynamic 
was unlikely, given the stalemate between the IRA and the British Army and RUC 
and so pressure mounted for a new ‘unarmed strategy’ with the republican 
movement. 
 
Prior to the end of the Cold War, unionists by virtue of their siege mentality had made 
limited use of international contacts.  Such parallels as were drawn tended to be with 
what were perceived as similar communities under siege such as Israel, Turkish 
Cypriots and apartheid South Africa or other ‘abandoned’ British settlers such as the 
white community in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.40  As white rule became not only 
discredited but increasingly unstable it was clear that drawing such parallels did the 
unionist cause more harm that good.  Furthermore as the Israeli government opened 
talks with the PLO, and the white South African government with the ANC, so 
pressure mounted on unionists, and the British government, to engage with Sinn Féin 
and seek progress in Northern Ireland.   
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 These changes increased the pressure on unionism to engage with the mainstream 
international community and in particular with Washington.  Unionists could not 
credibly argue it was a purely internal ‘British’ matter when the British government 
was increasingly involving the Irish government in the search for a settlement41 and 
this added to the pressure to relate to the international community more seriously.  
Post cease-fire unionism has had a greater level of serious contact with the US 
administration than any previous generation of unionist leaders and it has not all 
been negative and defensive.  There is now a section of the UUP which believes it 
can engage with the USA - traditionally seen as unsupportive - and make progress.42  
Such engagement is however a two way process.  As unionist leaders deepen their 
contact with senior US policy makers, so too are they open to pressure from the US 
to shift their own position in response to US efforts at mediation.  In many ways this 
is a follow on from the UUP’s self image as an insider group in Westminster politics 
and their preference for insider deals.  The emphasis placed by the UUP on their 
good contacts leaves them open to reverse pressure.  The influence of the White 
House and US talks chairperson George Mitchell during the negotiations is well 
documented43 and the personal intervention of President Clinton in making phone 
calls to the leading negotiators including David Trimble on the eve of the Good Friday 
Agreement being reached is further evidence of the pressure for a settlement from 
the US administration. 
 
Domestic Pressures for Change 
In addition to these international influences unionist political elites had also to 
respond to the strategic changes within Irish nationalism and republicanism, itself 
strongly related to the changing international relations environment.  The strategic 
                                                          
41 Ruane and Todd, (1996), 289. 
42 Ruane and Todd, (1996), 321. 
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Agreement, (London: Heinemann,1999). 
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shifts in republican thinking and the response to those changes by Irish nationalists 
are crucial to the building of a new political environment for unionism.  It is important 
therefore to establish the fundamental basis of these strategic developments to 
contextualise the response of unionist political elites.   While unionism has held a 
relatively undifferentiated view of Irish nationalism, it has benefited from the sharp 
divisions within nationalist elites on the use of political violence.  The first signs of 
‘new thinking’ and the creation of a new political environment came in the late 1980s.   
Sinn Féin acknowledged publicly that the republican movement was not strong 
enough, on its own, to achieve a united Ireland and that therefore a ‘broad front’ of 
nationalist parties and organisations or a ‘nationalist consensus’ was required to 
achieve that goal.44   There followed a shift in attitudes to constitutional 
nationalism.45  Though still rivals in elections and for leadership, the SDLP and the 
Irish government (especially Fianna Fáil and to some extent Labour) were now seen 
as potential political allies rather than as simple collaborators with British rule.  In a 
new policy document Towards a Lasting Peace (1992) Sinn Féin placed the Irish 
government, and the need for a nationalist consensus, at the heart of its political 
strategy - marking a reversal of previous perspectives.   
 
The narrative of the peace process has been provided elsewhere, but it is clear that 
a new political momentum was released by the process.  The IRA cease-fire and the 
dynamic of the peace process quite suddenly placed Ulster unionism in a position 
where standing still was not an option. The actions of the Irish government, 
constitutional nationalism, the US administration and to some extent the EU, in 
seeking to reinforce the cease-fires and the peace process created a dynamic for 
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political progress.  While the reliance of the Conservative British government led by 
John Major on UUP support at Westminster relieved some of the pressure on 
unionism, this rebounded on unionists when Labour came to power in Britain in May 
1997.  Determined not to follow the Conservative’s reluctant engagement with the 
peace process, and imbued with a generalised commitment to constitutional reform, 
the new Labour government, with its large Westminster majority added to the 
pressure on unionists to involve themselves actively in the process and that process 
was inevitably going to include reform of citizenship and developments in the equality 
agenda. 
 
Ulster Unionism was faced with an Irish nationalist consensus that was growing and 
becoming increasingly politically united.   In addition, the leaders of Irish nationalism, 
including northern nationalists, had formed an effective alliance with a US 
administration and a reasonable working relationship with the British Labour 
government which seemed likely to be in power for a considerable time.  Northern 
nationalists now made up over 40% of the voting population, moderate unionism as 
represented by Alliance could mobilise at least 5 or 6%; the centrist Northern Ireland 
Women’s’ Coalition (NIWC) 1% and the loyalist paramilitaries 3%.  Mainstream 
unionism, for the first time since Partition, was faced with the possibility that it could 
become an electoral minority within Northern Ireland.46  Nationalists were still a long 
way from securing a majority for a united Ireland, but if nationalists were united they 
could clearly secure majority support in Northern Ireland in a referendum for far-
reaching political change.  The UUP leadership were quite explicit about this threat 
during the negotiations.  Antony Alcock argued that if the UUP walked out it  was 
likely that a section of mainstream unionists would vote in a referendum to accept a 
peace deal which had been negotiated in their absence.47  The bottom line for the 
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UUP leadership was that however unhappy they were with key elements of the deal,  
any likely alternative was going to be much worse from a unionist perspective. 
 
The rejection of the deal by the DUP, the smaller UKUP and UUP dissidents was not 
surprising as they had been on the record over many years as opposing 
compromises and reform well short of what was in the Good Friday agreement.  
From Sunningdale to the present they have followed a relatively consistent position.  
All mainstream unionist elites have traditionally insisted that there is little point having 
a veto on the ‘final handover’ of sovereignty if they cannot prevent political decisions 
which change the character of the state and/or which move them towards a united 
Ireland.  This position was articulated by all the major unionist parties, including 
those who ultimately supported the agreement, as recently as 1997.48  It is the 
adherence of the unionists who oppose the agreement to traditional unionist 
positions that presents difficulties for David Trimble.  He must convince unionists that 
either the commitments on sovereignty are more absolute now than they have been 
previously, a difficult task, or persuade unionists that they have little choice but to go 
down this route - a more accurate but politically difficult message to sell.49
 
The importance of this analysis is not in coming to definitive conclusions as to the 
responses of Ulster unionism to the Good Friday Agreement but rather to show the 
limited extent to which the deal has required mainstream unionist elites to abandon 
the ideological basis of their previous positions.  The opponents of the deal might 
offer the clearest continuity with the traditional and exclusionary model of citizenship 
but even those unionists supporting the deal have not, as yet, been required to break 
with it decisively.   The key elements of the mainstream unionist approach to the talks 
- the strong exclusionary view of citizenship, the resistance to accept internal reforms 
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as a quid pro quo for constitutional guarantees and a lack of trust in British intentions 
- which have acted as a restraint on political reform are still visible in the public 
statements of mainstream unionists who support the agreement.50  It is also clear 
that the state is still contested and ‘unsettled’.  It is stretching credibility to suggest 
that Sinn Féin or indeed even the Irish state have ended their political ambitions for a 
united Ireland.  David Trimble focused on the ‘consent principle’ and the changes to 
Articles 2 and 3 to argue that the state is now more secure than previously and that 
therefore the Good Friday Agreement could be supported.  Paul Bew also argued 
this point.51  However the attitude of pro-Agreement unionist elites since the 
Agreement is not indicative of a group who believe their political future has been 
secured, rather the reluctance to engage with this process was outweighed by the 
considerable external pressures to enter talks and support the deal.  It was external 
pressure and innovative thinking in the framing of the Agreement rather than internal 
shifts in the nature of dominant ideologies in Northern Ireland which led to the Good 
Friday Accord.  It may be that pro-Agreement unionists and nationalists will 
fundamentally alter their political perspectives, over time, but it was not necessary for 
them to do so to sign the deal in April 1998.  The talks leading to the Agreement were 
successful not because of a change in internal attitudes to match the previous 
conflict resolution strategies, but rather due to the new international environment, 
related changes in Sinn Féin and because the designers of the Agreement moved 
beyond absolute sovereignty to create new visions of citizenship and governance. 
 
 
A new vision of citizenship? 
The centrality of the contested state to politics in Northern Ireland is by no means 
unique.  The period since the end of the Cold War has seen an increase in the level 
of secessionist challenges to existing states.  Initially the focus of this debate was 
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limited to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and it was assumed that the 
impact would be limited to that geographical region or to former communist states.  
However, in Central Africa, the Middle East, East Timor, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Quebec, Scotland and Spain, to give just some contemporary examples, there are 
now significant and continuing challenges to state boundaries.  It is also now clear 
that change in the territory of the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe was not 
a once off event but will have a continuing impact in the Russian border regions, the 
Caucuses and the Balkans at least.  Indeed, the sharp link between citizenship and 
national identity in contested states was starkly highlighted by the actions of the 
Serbian police in Kosovo during the 1999 conflict, in stripping fleeing Kosovars of 
their official badges of citizenship - passports, identity cards, birth certificates and 
even car registration plates.52  While not all of these states share the historic 
experience of Northern Ireland -  not all contested states enclose settler societies -  
secession and boundary change is no longer a marginal issue for international 
relations and academic debates need to reflect this changed environment.  
Specifically, the debate on citizenship needs to be able to move beyond its 
assumption of uncontested and settled nation states. 
 
Political conflict in contested states is almost by definition based on challenges to, 
and defence of, the political status quo.  In a situation where a dominant community 
has based their entire political programme around the defence of the status quo 
there is often no incentive for them to move or compromise on ideas of equal 
citizenship.  External intervention is necessary to provide an incentive to move 
towards political negotiations and compromise.  The nature of international 
intervention in regional conflicts is, however, changing since the end of the Cold War.  
Released from the grip of superpower confrontation, international and regional 
organisations have the potential to provide a more flexible response to regional 
conflicts.  The major international organisations and the dominant states within them, 
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however, still act on the assumption that state borders are best left unchanged in 
most circumstances, though there are some shifts in this position in situations such 
as East Timor.  The Rambouillet plan for Kosovo, was also a departure of sorts in 
that it sought to guarantee by external intervention, levels of autonomy which in fact 
would have fundamentally changed the nature of citizenship in Kosovo.  This was 
reinforced in the proposals by the French and German governments in early 1999 for 
EU or UN protectorate  status for Kosovo, within the Yugoslav federation.  
 
There is, however, no consistent basis for intervention by either international 
organisations or indeed by individual states, and realpolitik has left the Kurds, for 
example, outside such new dialogue for the moment at least.  The main international 
organisations such as the UN, or individual powers such as the USA, can in conflict 
situations, decide to uphold the status quo or insist on a search for a negotiated 
solution.  It is in the situation of engagement that new models of citizenship become 
a normative requirement, if solutions that combine justice with political stability are to 
be achieved.  As, interference in the ‘internal affairs’ of sovereign states is now out of 
the realm of superpower conflict, intervention is less likely to involve covert 
operations and aid to irregular forces and instead it is more likely to be based on 
formal and open public debates and interventions by the UN, NATO and the USA.  
The shift from covert or arms length operations to open interventions requires new 
procedures and agreements on the nature of, and the basis for, such decisions.  It 
also indicates a shift from interventions designed to secure a victory for one side to a 
process where mediation, peace negotiations and future external guarantees of 
citizenship rights are of greater relevance.  In the post-Cold War situation, there is a 
need for new models of citizenship and new modes of externally guaranteeing 
political agreements which may be based on a state remaining contested but where 
the form of the contest is peaceful rather than violent, in the hope that in an externally 
guaranteed ‘safe’ situation, a stable political solution can emerge over time.  The 
resort to military action against Iraq and Yugoslavia does not necessarily invalidate 
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this argument. These attacks were designed to bomb political leaders into political 
submission or bring them to the negotiation table but the ‘enemy state’ was intended 
to survive the military strikes and thus ultimately negotiations were, and are, required 
to finalise the details of the new situation. 
 
These new forms of intervention are clearly developing in a security context framed 
by the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of the USA as an unchallenged 
single superpower.  There are however other dimensions to the post-Cold War 
international environment.  The increasing globalisation of news broadcasting gives 
secessionist and sub-state political movements access to an international audience.  
Coverage of famine, genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing’ can increase domestic pressure 
on western governments to ‘do something’.  This factor clearly influenced the US 
decision to enter Somalia.  However, in the context of US failure there, TV coverage 
was ultimately insufficient to mobilise them to act in Rwanda in 1994, though it may 
have prevented some Western governments seeking to maintain the Hutu regime in 
power.  The growth of transnational social movements and lobby groups, most 
notably on the environment, but to some degree on human rights has also added to 
the capacity of civil rights or nationalist movements to link into a potential support 
network in industrialised societies.  The mobilisation of Irish Americans in the 
MacBride Principles campaign on fair employment in the mid 1980s and the efforts of 
the Irish American lobby to influence Bill Clinton during the 1990s is evidence in the 
Irish context of the growing linkages between domestic politics, transnational 
movements and foreign policy. 
 
In spite of the development of new pressures for intervention in regional conflicts 
there has been no equivalent debate on the new forms of citizenship and governance 
which will be needed to broker settlements in contested states.  The existing models 
of supranational governance or minority rights provisions are inadequate to the task.  
A new discourse on citizenship is required, that can explain developments in 
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citizenship in contested states and that can create new models of citizenship capable 
of guaranteeing subordinate national or ethnic groups their citizenship rights outside 
the context of a ‘settled’ nation-state.  This is not simply a matter of allowing dual 
citizenship or making citizenship and allegiance a private choice.  Rather it requires 
changes in the public relationship between citizenship and state allegiance.  The 
dominant perspectives on citizenship are analytically inadequate when transported 
outside of their Anglo-American and continental western European origins.  The 
nature of citizenship in much of the world cannot be adequately analysed without 
situating citizen-relations in the context of the contested state - the context often 
having its roots in colonialism.  The existing literature does not explain the basis of 
the perspective on citizenship held by Ulster unionists.  Attempts which have been 
made to reduce all such conflicts to being, in effect, extreme versions of German 
ethnic-nationalism are not plausible.  Citizenship in Israel, for example, is about more 
than alternative identities (though it includes an ethnic dimension): it is also grounded 
in Israel’s security dilemma, the wider Middle East conflict and the impact of settler 
colonial ideologies. 
 
Citizenship is not a unitary value - the product of a simple modernisation process.  
The model set out by T. H. Marshall of slowly evolving citizenship rights from civil to 
political to social is not (and was never intended by Marshall to be) an analytical 
paradigm for all societies.53  Rather, citizenship is part of the arena of political conflict 
and models of citizenship are part of the outcome of such conflicts.  Just as the 
national-democratic revolutions of the nineteenth century advanced demands for 
parliamentary democracy and political citizenship (at least for men), and the class 
conflicts of the nineteenth and twentieth century developed social rights in industrial 
democracies, so too do political conflicts over colonialism and over the boundaries 
and nature of the state mould the form of citizenship in contested states.  This 
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relationship of politics to citizenship is recognised to a significant degree in debates 
on class and gender but it needs to be extended to include political conflicts over 
ethnic and national allegiances. 
 
A new discourse on citizenship in contested states, in addition to offering a much 
more convincing explanation of the nature of citizenship, and the perspectives held 
by political actors in such states, can also play a role in developing new visions of 
citizenship.  A new model of citizenship is clearly required in Northern Ireland and in 
other similar societies.  This vision of citizenship needs to assert that members of 
such national or ethnic communities have a right to all of the traditional and 
contemporary rights of citizens, while retaining their own identity and political 
aspirations, regardless of their unwillingness to give allegiance to the dominant state.  
It must assert rights to equality such as employment, cultural rights, and a fair and 
acceptable form of policing.  These rights need to be clearly expressed in both 
individual and groups terms and need to be grounded in a commitment to see a new 
vision of equal citizenship reflected in concrete public policies, designed to promote 
actual equality of treatment between the communities. 
 
Even with a commitment to guarantee traditional rights of citizenship outside the 
context of an agreed state, some of the issues of contention in Northern Ireland 
would remain unresolved.   For example, disputes over Orange marches and 
unionists’ insistence on a monopoly of British symbolism in the public space would 
not be resolved by reference to traditional debates on citizenship rights.  Disputes on 
the use of ‘political’ symbols are a common feature of conflict in contested states.54  
An additional element is, therefore, also required if a new model of citizenship is to 
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have a significant egalitarian impact.  In addition to guaranteeing contemporary forms 
of citizenship, such as civil, political and economic rights in a new context, a model of 
equal citizenship for contested states also needs to offer new rights of citizenship.  
Citizenship needs to be extended to include a specific right to hold allegiance to a 
nationalist identity other than the previously dominant one and to have that reflected 
in the culture of the public sphere. 
 
A new model of citizenship designed to operate in contested states therefore 
requires two distinct elements.  Firstly a new form of citizenship which is guaranteed 
outside the framework of an uncontested state and secondly an extension of 
citizenship to cover new types of rights - specifically, in the case of Northern Ireland, 
focused on nationalists’ right to have their group identity reflected in the ethos, 
culture and practice of the state. 
 
This requirement for new forms of citizenship will clearly often conflict with the 
realpolitik of individual political disputes.  There is at present no global structures of 
governance capable of providing any consistent guidelines for intervention.  Yet, as 
in the case of Northern Ireland, citizenship in contested states is only likely to be 
transformed with a significant international intervention.  Indeed almost by definition, 
a model of equal citizenship in a contested state will rely much more on transnational 
governance than citizenship in a ‘settled’ state.  Contemporary forms of transnational 
governance are too fragmented, based on power inequalities, inconsistent and 
dominated by US/Western realpolitik rather than ideas of supranational law, to 
provide this external dimension on anything other than an ad-hoc basis.  Current 
international governance simply does not possess the necessary human rights and 
citizenship protections found in democratic states and which are needed to 
implement  equal citizenship in contested states. 
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Given the absence of suitable supranational institutions or legal mechanism, for the 
present at least, the only short-term potential for external mediation and mechanisms 
to guarantee citizenship in contested states is in the real political benefits such an 
approach can bring to key political players involved in the conflict, the protagonists, 
neighbouring states and interested international or regional powers.  If a new more 
equal model of citizenship can provide lasting and stable political settlements, it may 
play a useful role, even in a world dominated by realpolitik.  While this provides a less 
democratic and less consistent approach than a global or regional human rights and 
citizenship framework it is the motivation most likely to operate in practice. 
 
In Northern Ireland a combination of realpolitik, the historic and geographic 
framework, and the post-Cold War environment produced a type of external 
intervention which proved acceptable to the political actors and yet provided the 
necessary dynamic to push the peace process forward.  The role of the Irish and 
British governments operating as both political actors in their own right and also as 
external guarantors, combined with US mediation, proved successful in reaching an 
agreement in Northern Ireland.  There was also a history of external pressure on fair 
employment in particular, through the MacBride Principles campaign, but to some 
extent on policing, through reports from human rights groups and cases in the 
European Court of Human Rights.  Controversial Orange marches have in recent 
years also attracted many international observers adding to the pressure on the 
Orange Order to reimagine their parades as cultural rather than political events.  It is 
also clear that there are limit to this level of international intervention.  There are 
already signs that the two governments would like to move on to other priorities of 
their own and leave the implementation of the deal to the parties in Northern Ireland.  
Continuing high level US interest is not guaranteed beyond the Clinton Presidency.  
However, without external pressure the Good Friday Agreement would not have 
been signed and without continuing external involvement it will not survive.  External 
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intervention, in Northern Ireland cannot be seen as a once off mediation role at a 
conference or in negotiations, it will need to continue for some time. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this article to set out the parameters for such external 
intervention or specific elements for peace agreements on a global scale, but the 
Northern Ireland case does provide some indications of the important elements.  Irish 
government involvement in the early 1990s offered the Republican Movement an 
alternative strategy to armed struggle, in putting together a nationalist consensus to 
pressurise the British government towards a position of reform.  US involvement was 
seen to strengthen this alliance.  Continuing Irish government involvement as set out 
in the Agreement, the North-South Ministerial Council and its cross-border and all-
Ireland implementation bodies, also offer long-term constitutional links recognising 
the identity of nationalists in Northern Ireland and providing an institutional framework 
for North-South co-operation which is dynamic rather than static and which can 
develop over time.  British government involvement offered similar comfort to 
unionists, though never seen as equivalent by them.  The British government, as the 
sovereign power, also held out the threat that if no deal was reached then they could 
proceed with an imposed programme of reform including fair employment, cultural 
rights, a new police force, prisoner releases if the ceasefires held, and even a North-
South council made up of nominated rather than elected persons.  US involvement 
produced individual decisions such as the visa for Gerry Adams, which helped 
produce a ceasefire, a mediation role during the talks and some external guarantee 
that the agreement would be implemented.  Crucially, however, the Good Friday 
Agreement contains institutions of transnational governance in the North-South 
Ministerial Council and the Inter-governmental conference (and to some extent in the 
British-Irish Council), which creates a structured basis for continued external 
involvement. 
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The mediation role of ‘external’ players is however just one dimension of the Good 
Friday Agreement’s international significance.  More importantly perhaps, is its role in 
exploring new solutions to conflicts.  The provisions on equal citizenship are a central 
part of the Agreement, seen by Republicans as offering a dynamic for future change 
which allowed them to accept a deal which re-affirms partition in the short to medium 
term.  Unionist opposition to equality measures are also placed, for the first time, in 
their proper context - as part of their broader political position, rather than a 
negotiating ploy, hiding a more accommodating bottom line.  Citizenship in contested 
states is part of the constitutional framework, not something separate from it - a 
second prize for the ‘losing’ side. 
 
Although many aspects of the Northern Ireland problem and peace process are 
specific to that conflict, there are a number of essential elements which could be the 
basis of peace agreements and new forms of citizenship elsewhere.  External 
pressure, recognition in institutional structures and in citizenship of competing 
national and ethnic identities, and external guarantees of security are likely to be 
important elements of a solution in many contested states.  These issues cannot be 
resolved within the state (by definition of it being contested) and cannot at present be 
guaranteed at the global level because there is no agreement on the basis on which 
intervention should take place.  The international literature on citizenship needs to 
address these issues around the nature and mode of external intervention and the 
forms of citizenship which might be developed in such peace processes.  The direct 
link between citizenship and the traditional national ideal reflected in the nation state 
can in this way be loosened, if not quite broken.  The Northern Ireland case certainly 
emphasises the importance of external involvement to overcome the almost 
inevitable lack of internal dynamic towards a peaceful solution in such conflicts.  The 
negotiations in Northern Ireland, were also from the outset structured to link elements 
of transnational governance and the implementation of citizenship rights in the 
equality agenda.  Under the procedure of ‘sufficient consensus’ in decision making 
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and ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’, mainstream unionists could only 
block the North-South body and the equality issues at the cost of collapsing the talks.  
The Good Friday Agreement also points towards new models of citizenship more 
appropriate to contested states than those traditionally discussed in the academic 
literature and drawn upon in conflict resolution strategies.  Though still in a state of 
transition, the Good Friday Agreement has a great deal to offer an international 
debate on equal citizenship in contested states. 
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